



ΜΑΘΗΜΑ ΚΟΡΜΟΥ ΠΜΣ «ΕΓΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΥΣ» ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΔΙΑΛΕΞΕΩΝ

Ε΄ ΕΝΟΤΗΤΑ ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓΗ ΣΤΗ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΥ

DATE	T	ROOM	LECTURE TITLE	INSTRUCTOR
MON 11/03/2019	18.00-21.00	7A-01	Introduction. Naturalism in the philosophy of science/philosophy of mind ¹	Σ. Τσινόρεμα
WED 13/03/2019	18.00-21.00	7A-01	Causality in scientific explanation-Mental causation ¹	Σ. Τσινόρεμα
FRI 15/03/2019	16.00-19.00	7A-01	The immaterial mind ²	K. Frankish
MON 18/03/2019	16.00-19.00	7A-01	The material mind ²	K. Frankish
WED 20/03/2019	16.00-19.00	7A-01	The mechanical mind ²	K. Frankish
FRI 22/03/2019	16.00-19.00	7A-01	Consciousness as immaterial ²	K. Frankish
TUE 26/03/2019	16.00-19.00	7A-02	Consciousness as material ²	K. Frankish
WED 27/03/2019	16.00-19.00	7A-01	Philosophy of science ²	K. Frankish
FRI 29/03/2019	16.00-19.00	7A-01	Introduction to the Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind ³	Φ. Βασιλείου
MON 01/04/2019	17.30-20.30	7A-02	Philosophy of perception: Direct vs indirect realism. Direct realist theories Perception ⁴	M. Βενιέρη
TUE 02/04/2019	17.30-20.30	7A-02	Indirect realist theories. Philosophical aspects of virtual reality ⁴	M. Βενιέρη
FRI 05/04/2019	17.30-20.30	7A-01	Materialist views of the Human Person ⁵	Kevin Corcoran
MON 08/04/2019	17.30-20.30	7A-02	Arguments for and against Physicalism in the Philosophy of Mind ⁶	Kevin Corcoran
MON 15/04/2019	10.00-13.00	7A-02	EXAM	

¹Keith Allen, Tom Stoneham(ed.) , 2010, *Causation and Modern Philosophy*, Routledge; Armstrong, D. M., 1999, "The Open Door," in H. Sankey, ed., *Causation and Laws of Nature*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 175-85; Anscombe, G. E. M. , 1975, "Causality and Determination," in E. Sosa, ed., *Causation and Conditionals*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 63-81; Mario Bunge, 2011, *Causality and Modern Science*, Dover Publications, 3rd edition; Beauchamp, Tom and Alex Rosenberg, 1981, *Hume and the Problem of Causation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Block, N., 1990, "Can the Mind Change the World?," in G. Boolos (ed.), *Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 137-70; Chalmers, D. J., 1996, *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Crane, T., 1992, "Mental Causation and Mental Reality", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 92: 185-202; Davidson, Donald (1993) "Thinking Causes," in J. Heil and A. Mele, eds., *Mental Causation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 3-17; Dretske, F., 1988, *Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Fodor, J. A., 1997, "Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years", *Philosophical Perspectives* 11: 149-63; Judea Pearl, *Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference*, Cambridge University Press, 2edition 2009; Hume, David(1775) *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, orig. 1748. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Hume, David (1775) *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, orig. 1748. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Green, Celia, 2003, *The Lost Cause: Causation and the Mind-Body Problem*.

Oxford: Oxford Forum; Kant, Immanuel, 1965, *Critique of Pure Reason*, orig. 1781, trans. N. Kemp Smith. New York: Macmillan Press; Kim, J 1998, *Mind in a Physical World*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Papineau, David, 1993, "Can We Reduce Causal Direction to Probabilities?," in Hull, D. M. Forbes, and K. Okruhlik, eds., *PSA 1992 vol. 2*. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 238-52; Papineau, D., 1993, *Philosophical Naturalism*, Oxford: Blackwell; Price, Huw, 1996, *Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Price, Huw, 1996, *Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point*, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Salmon, Wesley, 1998, *Causality and Explanation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Segal, G. M. A. and Sober, E., 1991, "The Causal Efficacy of Content", *Philosophical Studies* 63: 1-30; Sober, Elliott, 1985, "Two Concepts of Cause," in P. Asquith and P. Kitcher, eds., *PSA 1984 vol. 2*. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 405-24; Strawson, P. F. 1985, "Causality and Explanation", in B. Vermazen and M. Hintikka, eds., *Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 115-36; Yablo, S., 1992, "Mental Causation", *Philosophical Review* 101: 245-80.

²Lecture outlines and supporting materials for all lectures by K. Frankish will be made available on the lecturer's personal website at <http://www.keithfrankish.com>. The following books are recommended for students wishing to prepare for the lectures:

-- Churchland, P. M. (1988) **Matter and Consciousness** (rev. ed.). MIT Press.

-- Frankish, K. (2005). **Consciousness**. The Open University.

-- Chalmers, A. F. (2013) **What is This Thing Called Science?** (4th ed.). The Open University Press.

³<https://mega.nz/#F!dERyWKDb!LUuk18ofv2n94NoJbZ1-sA>

- Gallagher, Shaun & Zahavi, Dan (2008). *The Phenomenological Mind*. London & New York: Routledge, chapters 1 & 2.

- Moran, Dermot (2008). "Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy and the Critique of Naturalism," *Continental Philosophy Review*, v. 41, pp. 401-25.

- Marbach, Eduard (2007). "Towards Integrating Husserlian Phenomenology with Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness," *Synthesis Philosophica*, v. 44, n. 2, pp. 385-400.

- Yoshimi, Jeffrey (2016). "Prospects for a Naturalized Phenomenology," D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds),

Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. New York & London: Routledge, pp. 287-

309.

⁴Byrne, A. and H. Logue (eds) 2009, *Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings*, MIT Press; Chalmers, D. 2010, *The Character of Consciousness*, Oxford University Press; Fish, W. 2010. *Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction*, Routledge; Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (eds) 2006, *Perceptual Experience*, Oxford University Press; Grau, C. (ed.) 2005, *Philosophers Explore the "Matrix"*, Oxford University Press; Matthen, M. (ed.) 2015. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception*, OUP; Noe, A. 2006, *Action in Perception*, MIT Press; Robinson, H. 2001, *Perception*, Routledge; Smith, A.D. 2002, *The Problem of Perception*, Harvard University Press; Schellenberg, S. 2018. *The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence*, OUP; Tye, M. 1995, *Ten Problems of Consciousness*, MIT Press; Βενιέρη, Μ. 2013. *Το πέπλο της αντίληψης: Αισθήσεις και αντικείμενα*, εκδόσεις Νήσος. Also the following entries from the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: "The Problem of Perception" (Tim Crane); "Epistemological Problems of Perception" (Laurence Bonjour); "The Contents of Perception" (Susanna Siegel); "Qualia" (Michael Tye), "The Disjunctive Theory of Perception" (Matthew Soteriou). From the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: "The Objects of Perception" (Daniel O' Brien); "Disjunctivism" (William Fish); "Sense data" (Paul Coates).

⁵**Materialist Views of the Human Person** This lecture aims to introduce students to three different versions of a materialist view of the human person. What all materialist views have in common is the claim that human persons are *wholly* physical objects (they have no immaterial parts). But when it comes to the relation that a particular human person stands in to his or her body, things get interesting. Some materialists claim that a human person is numerically identical to the human animal that is his or her body. Other materialists claim that while human persons are wholly physical, they are not identical to their bodies, but are wholly constituted by them. And according to yet another materialist view, while we are wholly physical, we are neither constituted by our bodies nor identical to them.

⁶**Arguments for and Against Physicalism in the Philosophy of Mind** While physicalism about the nature of mind and the mental is the dominant view in consciousness studies, new and powerful arguments have been leveled *against* it. In this lecture, we will examine two such arguments, one based on the idea of direct acquaintance of mental states and the other based on a distinction between primary and secondary intentions of concepts. Next, we examine a causal argument *for* a physical conception of the mind and the mental as well as examine a defense of what is referred to as *Russellian Monism*, the view that it's our ignorance of the physical facts of what's going on at the level of neurons that accounts for our failure to work out from neuroscience the facts about conscious experience. But, so the view has it, facts about conscious experience are facts about the intrinsic nature of physical entities.